I don't even know where to start. The Chinese system for determining political leaders is amazing. Instead of electing leaders democratically, the Chinese political department hires recent grads that have to slowly work their way up a sophisticated politically latter managing larger and larger populations (village => larger village => city => county => larger city => larger county => state =>etc) along the way. The systems framework is designed to weed out individuals until only the most competent people are in the top positions. What a brilliant way to insure that leaders are always competent. In contrast, democracy is a crap shoot. We may elect a competent leader or we may elect a rotten apple. The electorate is fallible; therefore, it cannot always elect competent leaders.
One of the commonly accepted beliefs in the world is that, "in order to be a highly technologically advanced society, a country must copy the west's style of democracy." However China is also proving that this common thought is bogus. China has one party in its country, the communist party. It does not have democracy, but it still manages to adjust to the wants and needs of its people through the entirely new concept of responsive authoritarianism. The Chinese state conducts vast surveys in which its people respond to what they want changed.
It is also proving that a certain form of communism can work, state run capitalism. Basically, the Chinese communist party are the ones running the major corporations in China. Communism in control of capitalism.
China is literally doing away with the old beliefs that democracy is necessary and communism doesn't work.
Our system is superior as its reliant on the government being so small that it's leadership's competency is irrelevant. The free market produces the business and industry leadership is top notch and actually matters. The only mistake in our system is that there is a government.
William Allen
China has concentration camps filled with dissidents China will implode, as it always has, pathetic Han.
Kayden Perez
Communism is a small group of Jews pretending to look out for the working gentile cattle while getting rich off their backs and watching the gentiles starve.
It is all good until your unfair trading practices get put to an end and your thieving corporate spies get booted out. China are intellectual thieves.
All China proves is that National Socialism works really well when the rest of the world treats you like a factory and turns a blind eye to your shady ways
>Communism is a small group of Jews pretending to look out for the working gentile cattle while getting rich off their backs and watching the gentiles starve. You just described capitalism.
>It does not have democracy, but it still manages to adjust to the wants and needs of its people through the entirely new concept of responsive authoritarianism. The Chinese state conducts vast surveys in which its people respond to what they want changed. nigger what
Jayden Moore
I'd rather live in a country controlled by the first 100 people in the phone book than a country controlled by Communist party members.
Dominic Lee
And that's why you are on the losing side of the Chink world.
>I don't even know where to start I don't even know where to start then stfu you slanty eyed boot head chicom
Eli Turner
lol the most competent and ambitious rise to the top in any system, and benefit disproportionately from the work of others. pick any time, any place, any system of government, and you will see this.
Chase Miller
>execute minorities >say they are more equal What does the chink mean by this?
to add, the unters are hellbent on collectively opposing this truth, while the ubers embrace it and strive for excellence.
Xavier Lee
A republic is based on the premise that the people are mostly self-sufficient and don't need to be micromanaged. The elected leaders are supposed to reflect the people that elected them, because it's more practical for a few hundred people to debate each other than millions (as in a direct democracy).
China, on the other hand, does not have a population that is self-sufficient. They do need micromanagement. The only way to get that is with the multi-tiered pyramid of leadership you described.
Brody Hall
Democracy isn't necessary, but china is not communist. You'll see them come tumbling down soon enough, Xi can't keep a lid on the southern provinces for much longer.
Owen Howard
No. Communism in polics is the process of the liberation of the proletariat.
What was the last landmark civic acts of China? Tax cuts and tax exemptions for the poor, elimination of utilities payment, 4days workweek by 2030. Here is how Communist republic is different from Plutocratic oligarchy like the USA.
It will collapse as well. Unsustainable. Their whole existence is an illusion driven by decades of gifted manufacturing work and artificially devalued currency.
Trump is going to end this. Hes been talking about their sham economy for decades. Christianity is also exploding in China. It will cast asunder the filth at the top.
May the Communist Party live in interesting times ;)
>The systems framework is designed to weed out individuals until only the most competent people are in the top positions. the Chinese government are entirely eunichs to prevent nepotism
Carson Richardson
>Instead of electing leaders democratically
Liberal representative republic is not a democracy. It is a financial oligarchy tiny veiled by a political spectacle. It is obvious to everyone in the year of 2018.
Sebastian Morgan
>Our system is superior only once you remove reproductive organs from all dual citizens
Daniel Phillips
>chinese patent office >not in green text Keep up the memes, chinky
Dylan Cruz
>Their whole existence is an illusion driven by decades of gifted manufacturing work and artificially devalued currency. don't forget the heroin
Ethan Flores
The U.S.-China trade war is in full swing, and it’s not going away anytime soon. The U.S. is beginning to see it more as a strategic opportunity to contain Chinese assertiveness than as a play to invigorate U.S. manufacturing. What the White House is demanding in negotiations, Beijing cannot concede without abandoning the state-led economic model that the Communist Party of China thinks it needs to address a staggering range of political and economic problems at home – ones that it’s been grappling with even before the trade war began. Thus, the trade war is only going to get bigger from here.
This Deep Dive looks at the potential fallout in China. Ultimately, it concludes that for Beijing, the economic cost of the trade war will be real but likely manageable if considered in isolation. China has ample tools at its disposal to ease the pain, and it’s been gradually reducing its dependence on the U.S. market anyway. The problem for Beijing is that it’s contending with much bigger political and economic problems already – problems that reflect a profound internal weakness that has bedeviled Chinese leaders for thousands of years.
>Counting the Costs Last year, exports accounted for around 20 percent of China’s gross domestic product. Of these, 18.6 percent went to the United States. If U.S. buyers for all of these goods abruptly disappeared and firms in China were unable to find replacements, it would dent China’s annual GDP by at least 3.5 percent – and presumably more when accounting for the accompanying loss of investment, the hit to consumption that comes with job losses and so forth. Chaos would ensue.
Of course, not all Chinese exports to the U.S. will come to a grinding halt, and some that do will find buyers elsewhere. A continued weakening of the yuan alone could offset much of the tariffs, albeit at the risk of raising the cost of critical imports that Chinese industry needs to keep humming and spurring capital flight by spooked investors. Moreover, the bulk of the value of many goods exported from China is actually produced elsewhere (e.g., Japanese semiconductors manufactured in Malaysia that go in a laptop merely assembled in China), so what’s billed as a $200 billion package of tariffs is actually quite a bit less for China. All told, most estimates put the current hit to China in the range of 0.2-0.6 percent of GDP. (Officially, at least, China grew by 6.9 percent last year and set a target of 6.5 percent this year.)
In reality, making any sort of precise estimate of how tariffs will hurt China is nearly impossible. There are simply too many variables in play. To start, it’s unclear how much the U.S. will expand the tariffs. We know that the latest round is set to increase to 25 percent on Jan. 1 if a deal isn’t reached before then. But we don’t know how serious President Donald Trump is about following through with his repeated threats to tax another $260 billion – effectively, all Chinese imports. Similarly, the size of China’s retaliatory measures against the U.S. will matter as well, since tariffs amount to a tax on one’s own citizens, and in China’s case will dampen consumption without benefiting comparable Chinese domestic industries. It’s also unclear what exceptions either government will carve out to ease the pain. U.S. firms had made more than 37,000 requests for exclusions from steel tariffs alone as of last week, according to the Commerce Department, which had processed less than 12 percent of them. The exemption process from the new round of tariffs on China has reportedly not yet been implemented.
How much of the increased costs will be borne by consumers and how much by producers, meanwhile, will differ from one product to the next, depending on factors like elasticities in supply and demand. China has already lowered tariffs on imports it can’t easily get elsewhere, for example. Global supply chains for different products will shift at varying speeds; just how fast depends on the medium-term planning decisions of thousands of businesses, not to mention other governments. Some exporters in China will merely find ways to become more efficient, and the closing of some will support Beijing’s ongoing reforms aimed at reducing industrial overcapacity. China will also try to reroute some products through neighboring markets not facing U.S. tariffs, particularly Vietnam, but doing this adds its own costs to the exports, and the U.S. will be on close watch for such activities, meaning they may end up taxed anyway. Where pain can’t be avoided, Beijing has some tools with which to soften the blow for the domestic market, such as targeted tax relief, subsidies, monetary and fiscal stimulus, and so forth.
All this is just scratching the surface. But in short, there’s no small amount of uncertainty about how far, and with how much force, the tariffs will ripple outward in China. This uncertainty is itself a problem for Beijing, whose historically poor oversight and data collection capacity put it at risk of getting blindsided by a crisis bubbling up in remote corners of the country. Uncertainty also has a way of breeding panic – perhaps the most unpredictable factor at play, whether in the stock markets, among foreign firms operating in the country or among Chinese consumers – that could make an otherwise manageable situation markedly worse.
Daniel Evans
Most important, though a 0.2-0.6 percent hit to China’s GDP from the tariffs would likely be manageable in isolation for a nearly $14 trillion economy, the trade war is far from China’s only problem. Rather, it will intensify three challenges, in particular, that China is already grappling with. The first is the effort to clean up the mess left behind by the 2008 financial crisis and the internal structural dysfunction it exposed. The second is its quest to find a more sustainable path to growth. The third is deep-rooted regional divides between the wealthier coasts and the interior – a fundamental threat to China as we know it.
>The Immediate Crisis
Breakneck growth in China was always going to be difficult to perpetuate. As economies become larger, high growth rates naturally get harder to sustain. And China is running out of the sort of easy gains – in particular, cheap exports, investment and the one-time gains of land and resource privatization – that fueled its rise, and domestic consumption has not increased quickly enough to allow the economy to stand on its own. The problem for China is that it cannot tolerate the social risks that would result from a massive increase in unemployment, and so it has generally been unwilling to stomach a major slowdown, much less a sudden shock to the system. Thus, to sustain employment, it has generally sacrificed profitability to keep some exports competitive and made up for the rest with credit and fiscal stimulus, leading to any number of distortions. This was laid bare following the 2008 global financial crisis. Beijing’s response – massive infrastructure spending, unchecked lending and an even greater reliance on public investment – compounded the long-term challenge by flooding the economy in debt, nonperforming loans and industrial overcapacity. Today, the country is dotted with unprofitable zombie firms, smog-choked ghost cities and marauding “gray rhinos” (over-leveraged conglomerates considered too big to fail).
Jonathan Parker
Painful reforms could not be avoided forever. To contain the fallout, the Communist Party recentralized and re-embraced authoritarianism in the form of President Xi Jinping, who launched a sweeping reform drive to address systemic risks – from asset bubbles to overcapacity to shadow lending to pollution – during his first term. This is a work in progress, at best, and one that is a considerably bigger drag on growth than the trade war itself. Thus, China expected 2018 to be a rough year even before Trump went guns blazing with tariffs. For the year, Beijing has set a GDP growth target of just 6.5 percent, after hitting 6.9 percent (officially, at least) in 2017.
Still, the more trade pressure the U.S. applies, the more it will complicate Xi’s best-laid plans. Over the summer, Beijing grappled openly with the question of whether it should be attempting to fight a two-front war – against the U.S. on trade and against China’s internal dysfunction. There’s been pressure on Beijing to ease off its deleveraging campaign, in particular, and focus instead on stimulating growth as the trade war intensifies. But the trade war is precisely the sort of potential external shock that has fueled Beijing’s sense of urgency to get its own house in order. And thus far, Xi has continued to prioritize deleveraging and derisking. Beijing has adopted some modest expansionary policies to calm markets and guard against panic – for example, expanding local government bonds for infrastructure projects and making regular injections of capital into state-run banks. These are a far cry from the money cannons Beijing used to blast away at the crisis in 2008, when China unloaded some 4 trillion yuan ($590 billion) in new spending.
Nathan Ross
>be king chink Xi >push for even more communism in schools and universities >chinks go to university and get filled up with communist ideas >get out in the real world and realize that nobody gives a fuck about workers rights which is literally the most important thing in communism >start protesting This is how china will die.
Jace Morales
But reform would be a high-wire act for Beijing even in more favorable economic circumstances, forcing the government into a high-stakes game of whack-a-mole to contain unintended consequences and prevent a cascading crisis. One notable example of this dynamic is the crackdown on shadow lending, which has reportedly choked off credit to many small and medium-sized enterprises that had relied on over-leveraged smaller banks. Those banks are now under pressure to rein in speculative lending, forcing Beijing to scramble to find ways to force larger, healthier state-owned banks to lend to parts of the economy they’re ill-suited to. It just so happens that SMEs, which account for around 60 percent of China’s GDP, are likely to be the hardest hit by the tariffs. Their employees shop for things and have mortgages to pay. It’s not hard to see how matters can spin out of control. The trade war gives Beijing just ever so much less room to maneuver.
Gavin Rodriguez
>The Middle Kingdom and the Middle-Income Trap
Even if Beijing is able to defuse its present debt troubles and stave off an immediate crisis, it’ll still be wrestling with another problem stemming from slowing growth: what’s known as the “middle-income trap.” This is what happens when a country’s economic growth stagnates once it fails to replace low-wage growth drivers with new sources of labor productivity and growth common among fully developed economies, such as robust consumption and high-value exports. China’s unfavorable demographics make its challenge here particularly problematic. According to China’s National Development and Reform Commission, China’s working-age population (those aged 16 to 59) will fall more than 23 percent to around 830 million by 2030 and 700 million by 2050. By then, a full third of the Chinese population will have reached retirement age, compared to around 15 percent today. This is likely to push labor costs up further, while diminishing its capital base and tying up a greater share of resources in caring for the elderly. In short, the country is primed to get old before it gets uniformly rich. Beijing’s recent abandonment of the one-child policy is too little, too late.
China has some room to continue to boost productivity. The country’s rapid urbanization, in particular, is likely to bring about ample efficiency and consumption gains. But this approach has diminishing returns. Over the long term, it’s trying to push through to high-income status by pouring resources into moving up the manufacturing value chain, particularly in high-end technological sectors dominated by the West, South Korea, Taiwan and Japan (and that, incidentally, would also help China get by with a smaller workforce). The trade war strikes at the heart of Beijing’s plans on this front.
Isaac Thomas
China’s state-led industrial blueprint, known as “Made in China 2025,” outlines steps to leapfrog the U.S. as a technological innovator in the industries that will matter most over the coming century, such as semiconductors, robotics, aerospace, artificial intelligence, green energy and biotech. Unfortunately for Beijing, the plan has also set off alarm bells across the West, not just in the U.S., and given the White House something around which to rally support for its trade war both at home and abroad (to the point where Beijing has banned mentions of Made in China 2025 in state-run media). Naturally, the U.S. tariffs focus heavily on the industries included in the plan, as do tightening controls on Chinese investment in the United States. Ending state-support for them makes up a sizable share of U.S. negotiating demands. Beijing isn’t going to budge on this front; it can’t without abandoning its core, state-led economic model. Rather, the trade war is likely to only reinforce Beijing’s sense that it needs to dramatically reduce its dependence on foreign technologies – and that the White House’s underlying goal with the trade war is to blunt China’s very rise.
It’s hard to say how much the trade war will hurt this effort. Tariffs alone are unlikely to do much. Made in China 2025 is being executed primarily through Chinese state-owned enterprises, which Beijing is better equipped to protect from the tariffs than it is the private conglomerates and SMEs hurting the most thus far. On the other hand, Beijing has relied heavily on technology transfers from Western firms (if not, as alleged by dozens of U.S. firms, outright tech theft) for its progress on tech development thus far. If tariffs make U.S. firms less inclined to enter into the joint ventures often required to operate in China, and if restrictions on investment keep Chinese firms out of the U.S. and Europe, Beijing will be stuck doing tech development the slow and hard way.
Jeremiah Davis
>The Long-Term Threat: A Return to Regionalism
The third problem is that the pain from tariffs is likely to be highly concentrated in a handful of export powerhouse regions along the coasts: Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shanghai and Zhejiang provinces in particular. Exports dominate each of these regional economies – as much as 50 percent in Guangdong, and between 20 and 45 percent in the others – and collectively, they accounted for more than half of China’s total exports last year. Jiangsu has the highest dependence on U.S.-bound exports, at around 27 percent. (Guangdong, which routes a sizable share of its exports across the border through Hong Kong, may be more dependent on the U.S. market.) These areas are the primary hubs of China’s electronics and machinery sectors, which as we mentioned are a core focus of the U.S. trade offensive. (In 2016, these sectors accounted for more than a third of Guangdong’s output.) And they are home to the majority of foreign firms, which will be mulling an exodus from China. In Jiangsu, Guangdong and Shanghai, for example, between one-half and two-thirds of exports from each in 2016 came from enterprises with foreign investment. This concentration may seem like a good thing; the coastal economies are by far China’s strongest and most modernized (with the largest consumer bases), giving them greater resiliency. And it means the interior masses are less likely to be directly harmed by the tariffs. Beijing won’t have to try to find awkward one-size-fits-all solutions for the entire country. But there’s a bigger issue at stake: the country’s very territorial integrity.
Adrian Evans
China’s history is one of cycles – it unifies, it fragments, then it unifies again. And when it fragments, it often does so along deep fault lines between the wealthier coasts and the less-developed interior. The coastal-interior divide isn’t just about the steep disparities in wealth, though this is certainly a big part of it. It’s also one of orientation. Coastal China runs on global maritime trade, while the interior has far fewer commercial opportunities. Coastal China’s priority is reaching its customers, whereas the interior wants Beijing to throw it a bone by transferring wealth from the coast. Left to fester, this problem can result in internal conflict, with coastal interests frequently seeking intervention by their customers. (See: the British intervention in the mid-19th century.) Mao, like many before him, tried to solve the problem by closing China to trade (at least somewhat), demonizing and then crushing the coastal elite, and imposing a dictatorship.
The historical problem has not gone away. China is constantly searching for ways to balance relations between the coastal Han and the interior Han. With newfound wealth since Deng’s reforms has come newfound and staggering inequality, for example. The more that modern China trades with the world, the more potential there is for the coasts to resist attempts by Beijing to rebalance wealth and pursue strategic objectives that may jeopardize trade relationships.
Xi is dealing with this in any number of ways. In part, like many of his predecessors, he’s using sheer force to prevent coastal wealth from translating into political power and to prevent coastal elites from opposing his reform project. This was part of the motivation of his sweeping anti-corruption campaign, as well as his recent crackdowns on profligate private conglomerates (many of whose leaders are now in jail) and on capital outflows. His centralization of the party’s control over the financial system, meanwhile, is intended partly to keep the coasts reliant on the party. And one goal of Beijing’s massive infrastructure buildout is to better integrate coastal and interior markets, allowing manufacturers to better take advantage of regional income differentials and traditional exporters to fix their gaze increasingly on domestic markets.
At this point, it’s not immediately obvious that the trade war would turn the coasts against Beijing. Sure, disagreement over how exactly Beijing should handle it at home has already spilled out into the open. There will doubtless be resistance to Beijing’s efforts to transfer wealth to the interior, its restrictions on outbound capital flows, its willingness to give ailing firms a pass from the deleveraging campaign and any number of other points of contention whether real or conjured out of thin air to settle a political score. When money gets tight, knives tend to come out.
Still, there’s little evidence that exporters think the trade war could’ve been avoided altogether or that the coasts think Beijing is declining a deal that would serve their interests. The broad impression in China appears to be that Trump isn’t actually interested in a deal – certainly not one that China could accept – and that this is just the first major salvo in an emerging Cold War. And unlike many of his predecessors, Xi is not yet trying to close China off to trade altogether. China is certainly not in a position to go cold turkey. Instead, Xi has been busy portraying China as a champion of free trade and globalization, however disingenuously, while using the tools of the state to pry open new opportunities for Chinese firms abroad, foster economic dependencies and cultivate political support with dozens of countries.
But, of course, the U.S. is in some ways trying to make this decision for Beijing. Some recent Mao-esque rhetoric from Xi is notable in this regard. According to the Chinese president: “Internationally, it’s becoming more and more difficult for China to obtain advanced technologies and key know-how. Unilateralism and trade protectionism are rising, forcing us to adopt a self-reliant approach. This is not a bad thing.” These are words from a man with a historical memory long enough to know that nothing about China’s rise should be taken for granted.
>Tax cuts and tax exemptions for the poor, elimination of utilities payment, 4days workweek by 2030 we were supposed to have 3 day workweeks by 1960 t. soviet union
>systems designed to weed out individuals only insectoids without souls or human wisdom need apply
David White
>liberation of the proletariat yeah and the proletariat are so fucking liberated in china, post winnie the pooh online and you'll get "liberated" from your body lol, can't even leave their country if they've posted a negative opinion online
Logan Lee
>copying fascism
color me surprised
Gabriel Phillips
Regardless of competence it is widely known that government officials are immensely corrupt and have too much control over said territories. Not to mention "loyalty" and connections most assuredly play a similar if not bigger role than skill.
Kayden Butler
China is a sweatshop with 1.4B NPCs.
Luis Watson
and that's frightening
Ayden Diaz
Democracy is gay and retarded, and it's worse for the population. In our era of technological miracles, democracy is busy discussing trannies bathrooms, women in STEM, pushing all kinds of alien radicalism...
It's gay and cancer, socialists ruined it, it just makes the nation vulnerable to those subversive attacks.
Besides the fact that you're obviously a commie chink shill, your idea that ching chong political system is not modeled off the West is retarded.
Adrian Howard
>tfw Chinese feels good man
William Baker
China doesnt have niggers and spics
Colton Lee
Take off your meme flag jew.
Lincoln Nguyen
>Plutocratic oligarchy Bro China is literally owned by the Li dynasty, like most of Asia, and they're among the thirteen families that own every country, directly or indirectly.
All nations are working collectively to renationalize in an effort to shake off the bloodbanking regime. Once we do that, THEN we can work on a proper Earth Federation and become a Type I civilization.
Don't think of it as a one world hyper government. Think of it more like a united libertarian confederacy that evolves into a stable federacy. By libertarian, I mean, each state will maintain the power to govern itself politically, economically, and culturally. No single system is a one-size-fits-all.
And China's "communism" sure as hell isn't the communism that socialists have been trying all these years. Calling it the same communism that Marx/Lenin/etc. intended is extremely dishonest and doesn't win your ideology any points to the rest of us.
At best, it shows China's communism to be a brutal but effective means of industrializing a war-torn unstable region. Capitalism doesn't work without "socialist" gap fills, and Communism doesn't work without capitalist gap stops.
I mean, shit, capitalism is in essence just free trade between sovereign individuals. We could argue "true capitalism has never been tried," but all that proves is that no ideology translates perfectly from the vacuum of academic thought experiment.
Levi Baker
I need proofs that China is a merit based technocracy and not a just a bunch of bureaucrats running on favors and nepotism.
Nathaniel King
So many concurrent fucking threads about "Would Communism Work If I Ate Semen?"
Look, you severely overestimate the unity of China. Even amongst Hanniggers there is a real distaste between coastal elite and people of lesser means living in central China.
Hopefully, Trump presses trade war, they go into recession and are kept in their box another 50 years.
Elijah Carter
Yes, because denying public representation is a surefire way to get rid of corruption... Damn, our system sucks but it sound to me like they just want a monarchy (sometimes literally) without calling it one. Nothing is more cucked than that.
Chase Diaz
>B-but they'll really do it this time, honest! Oh but if they capitalize to do it it's still MY communism!
I'm just trollin'. I think China will do great eventually. We're all figuring our shit out, and we all need to buck off the parasitic bloodlines.
Carter Turner
to be fair they re way behind britain and germany in that
Dominic Murphy
Wow CCP sponsored people on pol. You forgot that they remove anyone who does not support the Ping.
Aaron Perry
So the Peter principle on a national scale. Got it.
Chase Green
It does in its universities, while they are trying to look good for the sake of getting Africa into debt under them.
Chase Howard
They have, but they are all in check, which means if they do any kind of shit, they will be remove right away.
That's how their country work.
Nolan Wilson
No communists want to be the mindless drones who arent free, you all think you're gonna be the rich ruling class. That's the only reason it appeals to anyone but it's not representative of reality
David Price
>is the process of the liberation of the proletariat That process really isn't going well in china
Nolan Barnes
I bet not for long.
Xavier Kelly
>The systems framework is designed to weed out individuals until only the most competent people are in the top positions fuck no, and you clearly never been there the system is designed to weed out those without connections having some competent leaders on top is just an statistical necessity: with 1.2 billion people, some will make it to the top the country is somehow successful DESPITE the system, not thanks to it
Dominic Allen
so confuscianism?
Matthew Sanchez
What about that is difficult for you to understand?
Blake Allen
Their technocracy would be based on stolen tech, which is a fragile system
Lincoln Brooks
>state run capitalism where loyal party members run major corporations This is basically what the Democrats are doing in America, their loyalists run all the media and social media companies. I wish Trump and his people would nationalize them, so Jow Forums type people could control the cultural means of production.
The system of determining political leaders seems very powerful and effective when it's in the right hands, too.
Evan Wilson
All technology is stolen? Do we pay a licensing fee to the Romans for concrete? Do we pay a license fee to the Wright Brothers for airplanes?
Brandon Williams
if their ideas are so great why are they so weak militarily?
Josiah Martin
>Not to mention "loyalty" and connections most assuredly play a similar if not bigger role than skill. what is wrong with this? netorking is the most important part of politics in every system of Government if a person is able to rise to the top in the Chinese system then he is truly a good politician
Lucas Russell
>most competent rise to the top in any system absolutely not true in companies
Gavin Hughes
The idea of anyone having full power of the system is agains American ideals, no matter how far removed we now are from them. The idea of frequent elections and rotating politicians was believed to guard against what China has become. Central authority is bad, even if that means nothing gets done. Government is better when it is deadlocked and out of our way
Elijah Edwards
I was thinking how the chinese have such a better system. Xi has been a leader for some time now and will still be for more. You need leaders that stay in power for decades to enact true lasting change and policies. Think of Trump. If he does 8 years, what happens after that? Could another obama/hillary try and fuck up everything he's done and change policies? In democracy yes you can do that. So it doesn't fucking work.
The chinks have got it right. The country I admire the most is singapor that had lee at the head of it for nearly all his life, and he did amazing things for singapour. And we know that china copied singapour.
Dominic Collins
>one child law enforced by forced abortion >starvation rampant, people known to eat bugs to get by >great firewall restricting internet access >no freedom of speech >no freedom of assembly >no gunz >cant have an amazing rogue voted presedent like trump, must settle for the hillarys that have worked in government for 40 years must be amazing
Andrew Rivera
>Nothing is more cucked than that. republicanism is cucked monarchism is for man , also no the system that they have in china is not a monarchy it is a meritocracy
Ayden Barnes
Your argument is so far removed from reality that I know any explanation would be a waste of time.
Daniel Powell
what's a type I civilization?
Bentley Davis
>state run capitalism
National Socialism.
Jaxon Williams
>what's a type I civilization?
A nigger ethnostate. The "Type 1" refers to diabetes.
Blake Hernandez
The "individual" thought the western man created has failed and lead us to consumerism and ME ME ME! The chinese and japanese have a much stronger group mentality, maybe a bit too extreme but not worse than our individuality.
It seems like humanity always goes to extremes. We have to find a better balance.
Cooper Baker
>Calling it the same communism that Marx/Lenin/etc. intended is extremely dishonest and doesn't win your ideology any points to the rest of us. It is the same communism. They're going through a different transitory phase than what was attempted by most socialist states in the 20th century, but the end-goal is still the evolution to communism.
>What is socialism and what is Marxism? We were not quite clear about this in the past. Marxism attaches utmost importance to developing the productive forces. We have said that socialism is the primary stage of communism and that at the advanced stage the principle of from each according to his ability and to each according to his needs will be applied. This calls for highly developed productive forces and an overwhelming abundance of material wealth. Therefore, the fundamental task for the socialist stage is to develop the productive forces. The superiority of the socialist system is demonstrated, in the final analysis, by faster and greater development of those forces than under the capitalist system. As they develop, the people's material and cultural life will constantly improve. One of our shortcomings after the founding of the People's Republic was that we didn't pay enough attention to developing the productive forces. Socialism means eliminating poverty. Pauperism is not socialism, still less communism. — Deng Xiaoping, speech discussing Marxist theory at a Central Committee plenum, 30 June 1984
Blake Smith
You're delusional. China copied singapour's economy that's literally it. They shifted a long time ago to capitalism.
Anthony Gutierrez
As our country is getting filled with socialists and illegal aliens, scaling back democracy might be necessary for us to not turn into a complete shithole. >en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_nationalizations_by_country Also, did you know that the TSA basically nationalized private airport security companies after 9/11? Imagine if Trump did that to Facebook, Google, and Comcast, the libtards would be eternally BTFO.
Isaac Ward
And you can hear Lee talk about this and explain when the high ranking politicians visited singapour and were so impressed they immediately put in place new economic policies soon after their visit.
Benjamin Sullivan
I think China is a little more fascist than communist
Hunter Smith
>>starvation rampant, people known to eat bugs to get by it used to be much worst in the past like it or not the Chinese goverment has improved the lives of millions of Chinese citizen in a very short time , what the they have to they is the best they ever had >great firewall restricting internet access necessary to keep out american degeneracy >>no freedom of speech good, freedom of speach is often used by people in order to subvert the state just look at america and how the Frankfurt school and the marxists infiltrated it >>no gunz guns are for paranoid lunatics with small penises anyway so it is really weird that the Chinese dont have them i think guns would have suited them very well >cant have an amazing rogue voted presedent like trump, must settle for the hillarys that have worked in government for 40 years yeah instead having a incompetent narcisist you get a competent leader who by the time he becoem leader he had more experience leading man than any american president ever
Blake Davis
>The chinese and japanese have a much stronger group mentality the Chinese and Japanese are extremely individualistic i dotn know from where the idea that they are collectivistic comes from
