And even IF the MCAS incorrectly decreased the plane's AOA, pic related, located between the pilots...

If they don't include a manual way to adjust trim in case of a computer / hydraulic failure in flight that's a horrible design in any plane.
There should always be a way to crank the trim at least back to zero.
No clue about how passenger planes work tho.
I remember quite a few people telling me though that flying those commercial airliners is literally all automated. All the pilot does is assist now and then.
Probably explains the lack of training if so.

>The question is: can I solve the problem buy putting my hand on the trim wheel and turning it?
Yes, after cutting power to the motors that drive them- by switching the switches in the OP's pic.

>I know pretty much nothing about flight I’m just wondering if the pilots were not poo/pajeet and were well trained could they have sorted the problem with basic flying skills?

Blacks and Pajeets crashed 2 of these planes, while only operating 60.
Whites and Asians have crashed 0 of these planes, operating 320 of them.

>Lack of training
200 hours for one of the pilots.

Yeah but you have to remember that when the issue occurs, you get like 17 different warnings. Wrong AoA, wrong airspeed, stall warnings, the yoke seemingly has no effect but if you let go of it it's game over immediately and so on.
And then once every 10 seconds the stab trim spins by itself, but for all you know that could be the other pilot.
It's not JUST human error. In fact it's not human error because the pilots haven't been trained to handle situations like these. As far as an average pilot with average training is aware, this should never happen.

You can trim it manually with MCAS on. But as soon as you let go, MCAS will go back to trimming nose down.

>layperson
It's called layman you fucking liberal

>Yeah but you have to remember that when the issue occurs, you get like 17 different warnings.
I don't believe the official story.

Last white swede?

They were trained on 737 NG, which had no MCAS.
Boeing never mentioned MCAS in manuals for 737 MAX.
Pilots could not know there is a system that can mess with the trim when autopilot is off.
So when the pilots got uncommanded pitch down, it did not occur to them it could be caused by runaway trim.

>>layperson
>It's called layman you fucking liberal
How will we grow into the future if we remain rooted in the past. Think a little

Pilots shouldn't have attempted to remain in stall conditions.

Thanks user, you have answered my retarded questions well

Attached: 5C8FB821-A6FF-4892-9EEF-32DEEB99C3B5.jpg (720x404, 37K)

They didn't. The plane reported a stall while there was no stall, and MCAS brought the nose down to prevent a stall... But it basically gets stuck in an infinite loop and keeps pulling the nose down and down until you crash.

Ree that image racist

How about the black box logs or the audio recordings from the cockpit?

The only warning that could have showed during this incident is the AoA disagree light. But that was not installed on the plane - boeing sold it as an optional extra

>The plane reported a stall while there was no stall

Wrong. The plane sensed stall conditions.

>and MCAS brought the nose down to prevent a stall... But it basically gets stuck in an infinite loop and keeps pulling the nose down and down until you crash.

The system remained active because pilots kept trying to increase pitch- before the plane gained necessary speed

>How about the black box logs or the audio recordings from the cockpit?
I believe the Lion Air data still in hands of investigators.
>Black box
Monkeys taking

There was no stall, one of the AoA sensors was reporting an incorrect angle, ovwr 20 degrees off.
MCAS only took data from the single bad sensor (because boeing was cutting corners during software development)

>it did not occur to them it could be caused by runaway trim.

There are two big ass wheels right next to their knees that would be spinning. They even have a white stripe on them. Oh, and they make a ton of noise when moving.

They know when any stab trim is being commanded, no matter the situation.

>major airline mechanic ~15 years

This is what Boeing wants you to believe

What actually moved trim- motor or hydraulics?

The newest NG's have the MCAS system (year or so old)I’ve loaded that software into their computers myself.

Boeing was debuting a lot of new components on the latest NG's while they were certifying the max.

That’s what I thought, don’t they make a loud clattering noise as they spin?

Why would they want you believe that? Doesn’t it make them look bad?

I don't know anything about AOA sensors but this is like the oil spill blow out preventer discussions or the Oroville dam or any complex subject where people who don't work with it every day have absolutley no idea what they are talking about but can read, inwardly digest and then regugitate executive summarys and wikipedia entry conclusions with absolutley no understanding.

*moves

It’s still interesting throwing this stuff around though mate, when we finally find out through crash investigation one of us here will have been right

"Working as intended" would look worse

There are two ways to move the stab.

Electric
Manual

Both will turn the stab trim wheel in the flight deck. Electric can be commanded via the cockpit controls, or via the computers automatically

>Oil spill blow out preventer on Oroville dam
You're mixing things up

>The only warning that could have showed during this incident is the AoA disagree light. But that was not installed on the plane - boeing sold it as an optional extra
That's not true, pilots were having trouble with both airspeed and altitude in both crashes, as well as stall warnings going off. All of which could have multiple causes.

eu.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2018/11/05/lion-air-crash-plane-had-airspeed-problem-4-flights/1889396002/

Oh yeah, couldn’t it also be that they are carrying a little bit of globohomo on their shoulders and not admiting poo/pajeet retardation?

What I'm doing is questioning Boeing's narrative.

>When data is released
Who can know whether Boeing will tell the truth- these incidents happened outside of America.

Manual seems very difficult. Reports say that manual control is slow

>Believing multiple sensors failed at the same time

>Wrong. The plane sensed stall conditions.
Yes because the sensors were wrong. The plane was never actually in danger of stalling.

>The system remained active because pilots kept trying to increase pitch- before the plane gained necessary speed
Even if that was true, there were issues with both the airspeed and altitude indicators.

Isn’t the crash investigation team made up of people independent of Boeing or am I being naive?

That's what I'm thinking

Speaking of Oroville

youtube.com/watch?v=AgkmJ1U2M_Q

The trim wheel is about 1ft wide with a grip that pops out. One full rotation gives you about 0.1 degree of change according the digital flight control computers. It is not something I’d want to be doing if I wanted substantial change in a timely manner.

One problem I feel with the max is that there is no longer two trim cutout switches to disable EITHER the auto flight function of the stab motor, and the electric actuator entirely.

The max has just one switch that kills both. So, if they did switch it off, and it was outside the normal green band, they would be fucked hard to try and get it back manually, especially at a low altitude.

The problem is that when every warning lamp starts lightning up, the plane yells at you to "WOOP WOOP PULL UP PULL UP", and so on... You have a million different things to troubleshoot at once, the sensors are lying to you... It's just not a situation you can expect even well-trained pilots to make perfect decisions in.

>there were issues with both the airspeed and altitude indicators.

What are the chances they malfunction simultaneously? And that niggers crash 2 of their 60 planes while Whites crash 0 of their 320 planes?

>One problem I feel with the max is that there is no longer two trim cutout switches to disable EITHER the auto flight function of the stab motor, and the electric actuator entirely.

>The max has just one switch that kills both. So, if they did switch it off, and it was outside the normal green band, they would be fucked hard to try and get it back manually, especially at a low altitude.

Good information, it's what I wanted to know.

No doubt. Stuff happens fast.

HOWEVER, trim input is deactivated with opposite column input. As they were porpoising with automatic trim trying to kill them, and it being disengaged simply by pulling back, it would be obvious that trim was the issue.

Flick the guard, hit the switch. Everyone lives.

youtube.com/watch?v=Ora-yZCTtpg

I'm not saying there wasn't a DN (dumb nigger) factor involved. But Boeing knows who pilots their planes, and these DNs were successfully flying 737s before. Something changed about the max that made it require better split-second decision making to avoid these kinds of crashes. There are multiple reports of pilots having to disable automatic stab trim and land the plane while trimming manually. So yes, some people (presumably whites) did face the same issues and managed to land the plane regardless. But that doesn't mean the design of the plane is sound. If these issues keep popping up then eventually a white pilot will have a bad day on the job and crash a plane too.

>So yes, some people (presumably whites) did face the same issues and managed to land the plane regardless. But that doesn't mean the design of the plane is sound. If these issues keep popping up then eventually a white pilot will have a bad day on the job and crash a plane too.
Agree

Yes, but White Flight is racist, so White people still foot the bill for this quagmire

>HOWEVER, trim input is deactivated with opposite column input.
It's my understanding that that's not the case with MCAS. You can pull the yoke back and that will somewhat keep you afloat, but MCAS will still be fighting against you with stronger inputs than you can manage on the yoke.
In one of the crashes, the pilot kept the yoke back while the co-pilot tried to troubleshoot the problem. He then called for them to switch roles, so the captain could troubleshoot instead. The co-pilot didn't realize that the pilot had held the yoke back the entire time, and so let the plane crash itself.
However, the MCAS didn't disengage while the first pilot fought against it manually. He was only delaying the inevitable. It has to be disengaged by hitting the cut off switch.

>
>Yes, but White Flight is racist, so White people still foot the bill for this quagmire
Logic is racist, and this isn't hyperbole

>it would be obvious that trim was the issue.

What's considered obvious goes by an average person standard. In a global society the average person is closer in intelligence to that of the African than the White man.

There is no mechanical link between the control column and the stab. I could pull it back with my pinky no matter what the stab is doing.

There is a mechanical link between the stab and the trim wheel though, and it is pretty rough resisting it.

Aside from the single cutout switch, and opposite column input to disable the stab motion, you could also hit opposite trim on the yoke to kill it.

I do agree that the stall protection software is buggy, and may very well be the cause. The good old FAA mandated such a retarded system, and Boeing complies.

The two columns are also mechanically linked to each other. There is no way in hell the co pilot didn’t know it was being held back py the pilot

>I do agree that the stall protection software is buggy, and may very well be the cause. The good old FAA mandated such a retarded system, and Boeing complies.
This

>There is no mechanical link between the control column and the stab. I could pull it back with my pinky no matter what the stab is doing.
What I've read is that even if you max out the yoke, MCAS would still "override" your inputs. Whether that's because of aerodynamics, software or something mechanical i have no idea. I'm not a pilot I've just read one too many news stories about it.

>The good old FAA mandated such a retarded system, and Boeing complies.
And the FAA apparently gave Boeing permission to FAA approve its own planes, right? Hopefully there is enough of a backlash to make Boeing and co. regain their integrity and engineering standards.

No, Boeing added MCAS so that the MAX behaves the "same" as the NG so that they can keep the same type certificate and no extra pilot training is required.
FAA just rubberstamped everything blindly.

Yoke controls elevator, MCAS controls stabilizer trim.

Trim has more control authority at full deflection.

I could have sworn I saw a report that the co-pilot of either the Lion Air or Ethiopian crash didn't realize the pilot had been holding the yoke back, but I can't find it now. I know they are linked but the co-pilot was frantically flipping through the pages of the manual trying to troubleshoot it so probably didn't even have his hands on the yoke.

Nothing on any 737 can override the pilot during any circumstance. It has been the design philosophy of Boeing since it’s inception.

If this new software did disregard the pilots command, it is clearly a a fault in the new software, and not anything mechanical, because that shit is the same as the NG.

Hell, it was supposed to be so discrete that it was barely brought up in any of the MAX courses I’ve taken at the Renton training facility.

This isn’t an airbus with joysticks. It is two metal rods, that are linked together, sticking up from the floor right in front of the pilots. If one moves. They both move.

Yes MCAS was only supposed to apply a little bit of stab trim, see that the airplane is no longer in danger of stalling, and then do nothing. But with the faulty sensors, it would keep applying trim continuously because the sensors kept telling it that the plane was going to stall. There was no limit on how much trim it could apply in total, but it could only apply a little bit at a time. And as this guy explained, the result of a maxed out stab trim is that it "overrides" the yoke: You could technically manually unwind stab trim by rotating the wheel by hand, but you'd have to fully commit to spinning it like a madman.

How would they know that this phantom auto-trimmer is the problem when boeing kept it a secret? They don't know to disable it because they don't even know it exists.
They are too busy looking for likely *known* problems, they don't have time to wonder if boeing secretly changed shit and try to figure out how to fix it.

I find it hard to believe that such a system would rely on a single aoa probe, and not compare it to the other. If that’s the case, someone should hang.

As for stab overriding pilot input, I don’t buy it. It takes a good thirty seconds for it to get to full deflection in either direction. In that time they could have EASILY stopped the trim and regained control.

That’s it for me tonight.