Why weren't they effective against the USA?

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Nihonese engineering

They never got into range.

Planes retard

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IIRC the mechanical computers used in it were already out of date compared to the US. Also japan thought it was a good idea to send it off by itself. There are a number of situations where the Japanese fleet could have easily ruined the US fleet using the yamato and musashi. Too bad Japan pulled a hitler and decided to keep its prize so protected and never really saw use.

Japs large held them out of combat for most of the war and when they did see action they were fucked over by airplanes.

Never really left port. By the time they saw battle was at the end of the war and had very little support, the US by then had a yuuuge fleet that showed up to beat that big boy up. The Yamato is indeed a sad story.

This sounds like apologizm but idk

>There are a number of situations where the Japanese fleet could have easily ruined the US fleet using the yamato and musashi.

Name one other than the Battle of Samar that the Japs got scared and ran away from.

Battleships were a dead concept the second someone strapped a torpedo to an aeroplane

they were bringing katanas to a gun fight

iirc the main japanese strategy was to hold them back until an opportunity for a big showdown against burger battleships appeared
it never did

Obsolete when they were built. A vanity project for a navy that held onto archaic doctrine.

Japan held out for a decisive Big Guns/Big Ships/ in One or Two Big Battles strategy and we clobbered them in nickel and dime attrition. We fought with everything, not just big surface ships and we killed them logistically. We broke their military codes, we fought big surface combatants with subs and airplanes and we decided when and where to fight most of the time so we stayed inside their command curve. They had no rational national strategy, their army and their navy had little combined strategy and did not work well together. Their ability to build and repair their naval assets was limited by the existence of only a few shipyards with the physical plant and skills to build and maintain their fleet. They expected the war to be over by the time they needed to train new officers and crew and build or repair their ships.

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So what were they expecting when they bombed pearl harbor? Us rushing in and them holding the line?

yes

Was there any seccular reason to believe that?

fpbp

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carrier

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Correctamundo!
youtube.com/watch?v=iJiOJxwjqYI

One got close enough to take pot shots at a jeep carrier but then ran like a bitch from a destroyer.

Midway and Guadalcanal both come to mind.

>When you've already lost the war and had your country burned to the ground and your military all but destroyed but the Navy feels like it hasn't gotten enough attention so you use up the last of your national fuel reserves to send thousands of men and your last few ships to intentionally die for not strategic reason

The doctrine was ineffective, the ships were very effective.

They assumed that everybody was as bad at boats as Russia was.

Did the maps retreat before 5hey had to in those battles?

Because they never made the connection that the lessons of Repulse and Prince of Wales might apply to Yamato and Musashi too.

They learned the wrong lessons from the Russo-Japanese war.

You must remember that Japs were more racist than any fuck you've ever met, they had beat every opponent and figured that Whites were like the sub-humans they had genocided before. They were very mistaken and reaped what they sewed

>Japan proves that aircraft carriers are the future of naval combat
>proceeds to bereave in the big honaru of the battreshrip

But Midway was literally the matter of what millisecond the US Navy dive bombers pickled at, in some cases it was literally one lucky bomb that changed everything.

I'm not American and I don't play this world of shootyshit stuff but I read about the Pacific and found out that the Americans behaved suicidally like the Japs throughout the war to my surprise. That the carrier vs carrier battles decided the outcome of the war and there was a real risk of the US losing. Before I thought they beat them with superior tech which was true like in operation vengeance but a lot of it was Americans on suicide missions. Most people especially non-Americans just remember Hiroshima and think of the pacific war as the yankees flying Enola Gay out of the mainland and dropping the bomb with no resistance when the fight for the pacific and the islands was the resistance.

It annoys me how these wars are portrayed as lopsided. Same with the Falklands. Thatcher and Galtieri ordered suicide missions to save face and both sides banzai'd each other and to this day people think it was clinical and don't realize it was a real close run thing. By all rights, based on actions taken, the Argentinians should have won but got unlucky with bomb fuzing and the British got lucky against all odds.

Because they were never committed to a fight, they just sailed around the home islands wasting fuel and looking pretty.
Then Musashi and Yamato got skullfucked by SUPERIOR AMERICAN NAVAL AVIATION

why did they turn right around and proceed to bomb australia right after?

planes

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Oh, they did. Once.

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Battleships are the naval equivalent of those mallgoth punch daggers in a world where everyone's carrying guns.

Already obsolete.

The Japanese didn't have the logistics to properly support them. So they were always held back.

I'd say they're more the equivalent of a skilled swordsman. Beuatiful to watch and full of romance and nostalgia but incredibly high maintenance and obsolete in any engament with anyone other than another swordsman.

We learned the key to defeat battleships in general is to attack from only one side

Couldn't afford the oil required for maneuvers

>there was a real risk of the US losing
There really wasn't. The Japanese underestimated how badly they pissed us off; their only shot at victory was for a quick war - which is why they bombed Pearl Harbor to begin with.

At that point is just became a matter over how many had to die before the Japanese surrendered.

Yamato sank a escort carrier.

>Midway and Guadalcanal both come to mind.
no. in midway, yamato was too far away(main and mobile force were different units and separated by hundreds of miles). Yamamoto tried to bait the US to get into range of main force during the night after Nagumos mobile force carriers got shrekt, but Spruance wouldn't take the bait. in guadalcanal, they didnt have the fuel

read:
combinedfleet.com/prinob_f.htm
combinedfleet.com/guadoil1.htm

>there was a real risk of the US losing
you would have to be genuinely retarded to think there was ever a chance of the japanese defeating america in ww2. The logistical disparity between the two nations was fucking absurd, and the fact that you think japan even had a chance shows how little you actually understand about the war

Their actual operational plans The Russo-Jap war made them think it would work this way. They expected to harass a big US fleet coming all the way across the Pacific and defeat it in one or two battles while it was at the end of it's logistical legs. Then go to favorable terms while they consolidated empire. They expected the US to not have staying power. The European powers were being trampled by Germany so they saw opportunity to do a "under new management land grab.

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Essentially the wrong weapon for the wrong war. What's interesting though is that the IJN knew in advance of the Pacific war that these big battleships were essentially junk. The Japanese were the first to pioneer large carrier operations, and whilst they borrowed heavily from the RN and USN, they certainly were ahead of their time in combined arms naval warfare. Although this posed a political problem- the Admirals were aware that in an actual fight with the U.S., the big Japanese dreadnoughts and the entire Yamato class were useless. But the IJN had been building the things for decades, and alot of Japanese pride had gone into them, if they turned around and said a good chunk of the IJN surface fleet was a resource drain, the IJA would have been all over them in budget squabbles and probably would have gotten the upper hand in cabinet. So the IJN kept on requesting absolutely vital resources be poured into weapons they KNEW were not going to be winning any wars anytime soon, because of political reasons. This is the real reason Japan lost the war, their government was beyond shit tier (even the starting of war against the U.S. was a bonehead move but that's outside the boundaries of this thread.)

*Cruisers sank an Escort Carrier.

We got pretty good at cow-tipping.

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To cripple the US before they could do anything

Since the time of the US Civil War, nation versus nation warfare has largely been about industrial capacity. The industrial capacity of the USA during WWII, once it was directed towards warfare, was so huge that nobody was going to be able to stand against it in the long run. If somebody had been able to invade the east coast of the USA and march into the midwest disrupting industry the way they did in the USSR, then MAYBE there would be a chance. Or if somebody had been able to develop atomic weapons and deploy them on missiles, but that too was about industrial capacity. Otherwise, it was just a matter of time.

My late father in law was an air corps navigator for the USA in the South Pacific during WWII. He said that by the end of the war the USA was producing so many planes that if an existing plan sustained even the most minor damage, they would just shove it of the runway with a bulldozer and replace it with a new one.