Naval Lessons from the Russo-Japanese War

The Battle of Tsushima was one of the greatest and most decisive naval victories in modern history. The Russian Baltic (renamed 2nd Pacific) Fleet was completely neutralized by the much smaller Japanese Home Fleet. The Russians suffered a loss of 7 battleships, 14 supporting ships and cruisers, 4380 dead and nearly 6000 wounded, and 7 ships captured by the Japanese. The Japanese on the other hand suffered a loss of only 117 dead and 3 torpedo boats.

The principle reason that the Russian fleet was so overwhelmingly destroyed was that Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky chose to take the Baltic Fleet through the Tsushima Straits to relieve the besieged Port Arthur, a risky decision that gave the Japanese an incredible advantage to ambush the fleet in the confined waters. The Russian admiral attempted to lower these risks by navigating through the straits at night and in thick fog, but it did not prove to be enough.

The real question that is still on everyone's minds after all these years: Why on earth would the Russians takes their fleet through these incredibly dangerous waters? By this time, Admiral Rozhestvensky had already received news of the Russian Pacific Fleet's defeat at the Battle of the Yellow Sea (and Admiral Vitgeft's death), and that Port Arthur had succumbed to its siege during the 18,000 nautical mile voyage for the Baltic Fleet to reach the Far East. There was no immediate rush relieve besieged forces and the best course of action would have been to play it safe and achieve a decisive victory over the Japanese fleet. The rest would fall in to place afterwards. So why did Admiral Rozhestvensky take his fleet through the straits as opposed to going the long way around the Japanese Home Islands and avoiding the inclement weather and confined space of the Tsushima Straits that allowed to Japanese to ambush him so effectively?

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First of all the Russian fleet was on its way to Vladivostok not on their way to relieve Port Arthur. They weren't in good shape after traveling all around the world for months and were headed to Vladivostok to refit before engaging the Japanese. Rozhestvensky knew that the Tsushima strait would be risky but he thought he could make it through.

The biggest reasons for the decisive Japanese victory were Adm. Togo's experience and also the state of unreadiness and poor morale of the Russian fleet when it finally arrived in Asia. Steel warships were also still relatively new at the time and Togo was really the only admiral active at the time anywhere in the world who actually had a significant amount of experience using them in actual combat as opposed to exercises and theory.

>So why did Admiral Rozhestvensky take his fleet through the straits as opposed to going the long way around the Japanese Home Islands and avoiding the inclement weather and confined space of the Tsushima Straits that allowed to Japanese to ambush him so effectively?
The crews of those ships had already endured an extremely long, arduous journey just getting to northeast Asia.

>Rozhestvensky knew that the Tsushima strait would be risky but he thought he could make it through.
I really just can't understand his reasoning behind this though. He knew that the Japanese knew he was coming. He should have been able to reasonably assume that his fleet would try going through the Tsushima Straits to make the voyage shorter, it seems obvious (in hindsight, I'll grant) that the Japanese Home Fleet would be waiting for him there to take advantage of his poor state of affairs and the fact that he would have little room to maneuver and gain an advantage over the Japanese fleet. If he had taken the long way around the Home Islands, it's pretty reasonable to assume the Japanese would not have been able to intercept him and he would have been in much better condition to take the fight to them in the coming weeks or months.

Basically, I'm saying that I understand why he wanted to get through Tsushima, but it seems like even a junior officer with little experience with sailing or combat would have been able to deduce that it was probably going to be a really, really, really bad idea.
All the more reason not to make it all for nothing by throwing your fleet into a meatgrinder.
I'll be dumping some cool naval pictures from time to time ITT, it doesn't have to be solely about the Russo-Japanese War and I'd encourage discussion about all kinds of naval warfare. It's been a long time since we've had a good naval thread on Jow Forums that didn't devolve into chink and burger dick measuring contests.

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It's a shame that Japanese ships no longer have the Chrysanthemum figurehead on their prows, I always thought that was a really cool touch and it made their ships aesthetic as fuck. I'm guessing that part of their terms of surrender in WWII included making their navy no longer the personal possession of the Emperor, so maybe that's why they don't do it anymore.

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Is this the same fleet that accidentally shot some British fishing ships and later each other?
I see the Jow Forums thread screen cap pop up in humor threads sometimes

The simplest explanation is that (like most of the Western world at the time) Rozhestvensky underestimated the military capabilities of Japan. The decision to try the straights was one of expediency and also of necessity, the voyage around the home islands would also be very risky. He could very easily get caught in open water on the other side of Japan with all escape routes blocked off. Considering the state that the Russian fleet was in and the low morale of the crew, Rozhestvensky made the decision that the short route to Vladivostok was imperative, regardless of risk. (Like I said the long route was also not risk-free either.)

That being said he did take reasonable precautions to disguise his movements such as attempting to traverse the straights at night and avoiding known shipping routes in the area. Rozhestvensky probably made the assumption that even if his ships were discovered as they crossed the straights, he would either have enough time to make it through before any significant Japanese force arrived or if not that he could fight his way through.

The problem was not only did the Japanese know he was coming but Togo had handpicked the Tsushima straight as the place to fight the battle and his fleet was already nearby and ready.

Another huge point that often gets overlooked about Tsushima is that it's the first naval battle in history where use of the wireless radio had a significant impact on events. From almost the first moment that Japanese ships sighted the enemy Togo was made aware of the Russian fleet's location at his base in Busan and was able to respond immediately and in force. Other navies in the world were using the wireless radio too but as far as I recall the Japanese were the first to fully implement it and realize the massive effect it could have in coordinating naval movements. The Russian fleet was still relying almost entirely on flags and signal lamps for communication.

cont.

I guess the best answer I can think of is that Rozhestvensky assumed that even if he WERE sighted, the Japanese would not be able to respond as quickly and decisively as they did.

Yeah, it almost sparked a war with Britain because the were allied with the Japanese but neutral in the war unless they were attacked first.

>Rozhestvensky underestimated the military capabilities of Japan
Pretty much this. The Japanese made meteoric advancements in naval warfare from the turn of the century until their defeat in WWII. They were the first to realize the importance of communications, night optics, and later naval aviation. It's almost ironic that despite being so progressive in their tactics and strategy, they ultimately invested too many resources in WWII into the old style of "big gun" strategy, thinking that battleships and heavy cruisers would win them the war when in reality it was aircraft carriers that turned the tide of battle.

>The crews of those ships had already endured an extremely long, arduous journey just getting to northeast Asia.
They were clearly in grips of full blown delirium tremens the day after they left Russia

>The Second Pacific Squadron sailed through the Baltic into the North Sea. The Russians had heard fictitious reports of Japanese torpedo boats operating in the area and were on high alert. In the Dogger Bank incident, the Russian fleet mistook a group of British fishing trawlers operating near the Dogger Bank at night for hostile Japanese ships. The fleet fired upon the small civilian vessels, killing several British fishermen and one trawler was sunk while another six were damaged.[16] In confusion the Russians even fired upon two of their vessels, killing some of their men. The firing continued for twenty minutes before Rozhestvensky ordered firing to cease; greater loss of life was only avoided because the Russian gunnery was highly inaccurate.

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Anybody got the screencap from the Jow Forums humor thread detailing all of their antics during the cruise? If I recall correctly the Brits even detained their fleet after that incident until the Russian government coughed up a ransom hahahaha

The source is Geoffrey Reagens' Naval Blunders. It's a great book

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>Jow Forums goes sailing

fucking ants get off the internet

How will the Russian Navy ever recover, oh wait they didn't

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It's very easy and enjoyable to make fun of the Russians' performance with this naval blunder, but you also need to consider the context of the time period, and when you do that it's actually really remarkable that they were able to pull that stunt off, regardless of the final outcome. At the time all of their ships were obviously coal-fired, and due to international treaties they were not allowed to coal at neutral ports. Russia, unlike the British, French, and Americans, had no friendly ports between Europe and the Pacific to stop and take on bunkers. So the very fact that they were able to supply and fuel their ships during that massive voyage was actually pretty remarkable at the time, and the naval powers of the world took note of it and realized that Russia had naval capabilities that they had severely underestimated. Even after their defeat at Tsushima, most naval commentators at the time didn't ridicule the Russians for their failure, but were instead astonished at what the Japanese had pulled off. It cemented their beliefs that the Japanese were rapidly becoming the most powerful and technologically advanced naval power in the Pacific. Furthermore, they had far more combat experience than any of the European powers with naval warfare. The Europeans hadn't fought a serious naval battle since the 1840s, which primarily consisted of ramming and boarding actions, whereas the Japanese had not only had experience during the Civil War but also inflicted a serious defeat against the Chinese (who were considered a much more powerful naval force) at the Battle of the Yalu.

As for Russia beating the Turks, the Georgios Averof basically threw the entire Turkish navy of out the Aegean sea single-handedly in the first Balkans war, while what else of a Greek navy there was (not much worth mentioning) tried and failed to keep up.

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They should have given the orders to not fire until they could confirm that it was a Japanese ship, just so England wouldn’t be suspicious and so the Baltic Fleet didn’t have to go all the way around africa

>delirium tremens
Imagine the horror of being a Russian officer successfully administering discipline and finding out the result.

>greater loss of life was only avoided because the Russian gunnery was highly inaccurate.

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