How do I permanently delete files properly so they can't be recovered no matter what?

This is probably the third time you've asked this today, pedo.

shred && rm

There's your answer OP. /thread and fuck off

>format
>full disk encryption with LUKS (since you're not gonna use it you don't have to worry about performance overheard so go maximum autism here)

Destruction of evidence is also a crime

Put your hard drive out to sea tie to a tranny and drop it in the ocean (the dilated hole makes them sink)

Don't listen to the larpers here, you just have to fill the drive with other stuff because when the os "deletes" your files it merely removes a pointer to it thus the files are still there just not accessible and the os marks where they were as "free" so if you fill it with other stuff the os will just rewrite on that "free space" effectively destroying the previous files in the process

This.
>SSD: Impossible
>HDD: 0101 secure erase sld be o.k.

Explain to a brainlet why it's not possible to truly erase files on an SSD. If you delete them there's free space again, so where does the file go?

Are you talking about SSDs?
>Still, virtually impossinle to secure erase an individual file.
Re the entire SSD, I guess yr approach works. Don't forget the Trim.

SSD's are overprovisioned to lessen the effects of wear and tear on the cells. You get a 1TB drive it's actually 1.2TB. The OS doesn't really know where everything is stored so when you erase it, the data could still reside in the part of the drive the OS can't directly access. FBI gets it and the data is still there.

>physically destroy the media they were stored on according to some industry standard
Basically this. I worked for a defense contractor and had to handle old hard drives according to NSA specs.
>fill drive with 0s
>fill drive with 1s
>repeat 5 times
>put them in a box, ship them to NSA in tamper-evident packaging, where they will be melted

os does know. all memory is given inode addresses. using gnu shred command flawlessly erases data. on platter hdds it is still recoverable to some extent.

dban Auto Nuke

>How do I permanently delete files properly so they can't be recovered no matter what?
You "delete" the files by encrypting them.

use "shred", you incompetent fuck.
$ shred -z -u
and now it's gone forever.

>Explain to a brainlet why it's not possible to truly erase files on an SSD
whoever told you that is a fucking moron. ssd, like mechanical drives, once a file is deleted properly (eg: shred or similar), it's gone forever. not even the homosexuals at your local police department can recover the data.

what are you trying to hide huh?

>FBI gets it and the data is still there.
you are one of the dumbest motherfuckers this world has ever known. to think for a moment that an operating system is writing sensitive data outside of its own file systems that the "FBI" can access. your level of retardation is truly remarkable. suicide is your only recourse.

Are you on Epstein's list?

turn them over to the police for immediate destruction. Theyll just be glad to get those vile things out of circulation.

Just do shred command in linux. It overwrites the file with random shit

single zero pass will do it.

dd from /dev/zero

>os does know. all memory is given inode addresses. using gnu shred command flawlessly erases data. on platter hdds it is still recoverable to some extent.
On the contrary, SSDs work differently. The SSD controller presents the OS with an abstracted view over the actual hardware so the while the OS thinks it has direct access, in fact it does not as the SSD controller does the dirty work including overprovisioning behind the scenes. You have no idea as the OS has no idea whether data "erased" from an SSD in any manner is actually gone.
You're glowing in the dark

Never save to SSDs

shred -n=5 file

Checked and rekt

>You're glowing in the dark
you wouldn't even know what that means, faggot. you clearly have no idea how hard drives work (of any kind). just shut the fuck up, you clueless cunt.

ask hillary

You obviously have a job to do but since you're being an asshole I'll break it down so even the brainlets understand.
*ahem*
Say you manufacture SSDs and you realize SSDs have a limited number of writes. You want to make SSDs that can withstand the typical consumer lifecycle though so what do you do? Easy. Sell a 2 terabyte SSD as a 1 terabyte SSD. The consumer buys a 1TB drive, the controller in the drive tells the OS it's 1 TB but really there are enough cells in the drive for 2 TB of data. The upshot is when the user "deletes" a 20MB file, instead of the controller being forced to delete said 20MB from disk, it can just present another part of the overprovisioned drive to the OS that is already empty. The OS sees a drive with 20MB more "free space" when in reality, the 20 MB of data is still there just shuffled out of sight. So no matter how powerful and comprehensive you suite of tools are, including DBAN, secure erase, etc. is, the drive will just lie to you and tell you it's empty when in fact the overprovisioned area is chock full.
Hopefully OP understands now. Hopefully yiur job is that much harder. Try being less of an insufferable cunt next time with people who know what they're talking about. Asshole.

Only if there's evidence

If you want to be 100% sure that your files on your HDD won't be recoverable you should probably do this
for i in {1..8}; do
dd if=/dev/urandom of=/dev/sda
done

To balance the bad news with good, OP, there's an easy way around this problem. Full disk encryption from the very beginning so plaintext data is never written to the drive in the first place. You're welcome. Oh, and fuck you again.

>Ctrl+x
>burn on CD
>microwave CD
>win

Some information is always recoverable. The others are right, the drive has to be destroyed.

thermite the drive

DBan

this.
I actually just delete entire drives once they're full and use recovery software when I need an older file, I'm able to store like 32 TB in an 8 TB drive

forget about trying to delete an individual file, ignoring everything like filesystem metadata that may not be deleted by the tool there's far too many things to go wrong like caching or other programs generating metadata/backups of that file
if it's a harddrive: overwriting with zeroes will be sufficient in most cases, do multiple passes of random or patterned data if you're paranoid and have literally days to spare, hint: random data and proper encryption are indistinguishable and some countries that have laws on key disclosure laws may use this to lock you up without due process regardless of wrongdoing
if it's a solid state drive: you can't just overwrite the drive with data since ssd controllers don't transparently expose the underlying storage to the OS in the same way that mechanical drives do and not all of the drive is exposed to the OS to begin with, if you need to erase a ssd you need to use the ata secure erase standard which as an aside is implemented by the manufacturer and is something that lives on the drive controller, physical destruction is likely the only way to ensure data loss on ssds as a result so be sure to use full disk encryption from the start

and remember, if you're doing anything illegal there will be a ton of circumstantial evidence outside of your physical media that will incriminate you

yeah but entropy is a real bitch

DBan doesn't support DoD 5222.2M, NIST 800-88. Blancco Drive Eraser does.

just don't put it on the hard drive

>forget about trying to delete an individual file
What's with this meme?
Sure, if you just rm a file, it just gets removed from the file system entries, and the data remains on disk with no guarantee of ever being overwritten, but how about, before deleting, simply overwriting this single file with random data?
Better than nuking the whole drive.

how about you actually educate yourself fucking faggots?
web.archive.org/web/20190709115417/https://www.usenix.org/legacy/events/fast11/tech/full_papers/Wei.pdf

I won't help you pedo

>meme
go read the man page for shred or the documentation of any tool that promises to overwrite an individual file and they will explicitly tell you that they do not work well on journaled filesystems (the default filesystem type for the past 15+ years), they will also tell you that they cannot erase other copies of the file like cached copies (either by the filesystem, an explicit io cache, program specific caches) or other revisions of that file (file editor revisions, things like git), that they cannot erase metadata that other programs may generate (e.g., thumbnail caches), that they cannot erase references to that file (like recent file history), etc, all things that add up to circumstantial evidence that a file or set of files has existed on the drive at one point but no longer does and as points out destruction of evidence is a crime in and of itself if what you're talking about is illegal
additionally if you try to use a tool like shred on a ssd you may find that the file itself gets overwritten as far as the operating system is concerned but because of the architectural differences between ssds and traditional mechanical harddrives, namely over provisioning and wear levelling, that despite the file being gone there may be partial copies of the file on other blocks that aren't transparently exposed to the operating system but may be found during a forensic investigation

there's a use for tools like shred but they aren't secure in the slightest and they don't pretend to be secure

with a magnetic axe

Only if its a crime and convicted and used as evidence

store them on a 2018 macbook pro

Yeah I don't get how a hard drive can be recoverable if you dd it with 0 or random data. Once the bits are flipped how the hell could you recover anything?

Sorry I'm kinda dumb but how exactly does a drive have basically infinite space? If no matter how many times it's rewritten previous data is still there how is that possible?

sure, but if you're at the point where there's a criminal investigation against you and your drives were seized and they're actually bothering to do a proper forensic investigation they're going to want to convict you of something and there'll be plenty of evidence of missing/deleted files
if we're talking about trade secrets or corporate espionage instead of illegal files then just deleting the file isn't good enough, even small/medium businesses go through the expense of getting drives shredded

this

the physics behind it are that you're trying to write digital values (bits, either on or off) to an analogue storage medium, in this case you're magnetising a metal platter, but due to the nature of analogue formats you can't usually completely set values that are either on or off, if you're old enough to remember rerecording things over vhs or casette tapes you'll remember that there'll be some faint left over signal from the video or audio track

if you were to express the value of the bit on a scale for 0 to 10, where 0 is - and 10 is +, and you write a + to a location on a fresh harddrive where the value is 0 the resulting value would shoot up to 10, but if you were to write a - back to the same location it wouldn't go straight to 0 because of the residual magnetism, it might go to 1 instead, but 1 isn't - so harddrives need to correct this, they might say 'every value below 3 is a - and every value above 6 is a +' which generally works but it means that there's a trace left behind of the previous bit, and if you write a 1 to the location again it might go back to 9 (or 8.9)
it's because of this residual magnetism that more secure standards for overwriting hdds recommend overwriting data with random or patterned bits instead of just 0 as well as using multiple passes, as if you're performing forensics with an electron scanning microscope and you assume the data has been overwritten with the same pattern (0s) you can in theory recover that data, but in practice writing over the whole harddrive with 0s is noisy and there's entropy to deal with, I'll try to find and link a paper that covers this topic, but the tl;dr is that even on low density drives (250gb) that are brand new (never before been written to) the chance of recovering a single bit is pretty low, and the chance of recovering successive bits is exponentially harder, it's for this reason that writing over a harddrive with 0s is usually sufficient

p.s., from ssds use this to their advantage, because they're not dealing with less reliable/more difficult magnetism but instead flash storage they can use a trick that electrical engineers have been using for a long time and get 2 bits or higher out of the same flash cell, they could say that 0 is 00, 2.5 is 01, 5 is 10, and 10 is 11, giving you 2 bits instead of just 1 bit that on/off would give you

>Sorry I'm kinda dumb but how exactly does a drive have basically infinite space?
it doesn't, the poster you're getting that from is either dumb or trolling, once data has been overwritten it's generally not recoverable even under forensic settings

oldfag detected

Learn how harddrives actually record data and how operating systems find them using indexing. It will be clear then

when you buy a new drive, before use you it, encrypt it with full disk encryption, either with luks/dmcrypt on linux or veracypt on windows.
It will probaby take several hours or longer depending on the capacity of the drive, the benefit of this is if you ever need to delete files FAST, without any possibility of recovery, you can just delete the header of fully encrypted disk/do quick format and that is it.

wait, is this a real thing?

p.p.s., from >I'll try to find and link a paper that covers this topic
found it: vidarholen.net/~vidar/overwriting_hard_drive_data.pdf
relevant except:
>Even on a single write, the overlap at best gives a probability of just over 50% of choosing a prior bit (the best read being a little over 56%). This caused the issue to arise, that there is no way to determine if the bit was correctly chosen or not. There-fore, there is a chance of correctly choosing any bit in a selected byte (8-bits) – but this equates a probability around 0.9% (or less) with a small confidence interval either side for error.
>Resultantly, if there is less than a 1% chance of determining each character to be recovered correctly, the chance of a complete 5-character word being recovered drops exponentially to 8.463E-11 (or less on a used drive and who uses a new raw drive format). This results in a probability of less than 1 chance in 10Exp50 of recovering any useful data. So close to zero for all intents and definitely not within the realm of use for forensic presentation to a court.
keep in mind this is on old low density drives from 2006 and earlier, the theory is that with higher density drives the probability of successful recovery drops significantly, but the paper covers this

You use the same free open-source software Hilldawg used to delete her emails; BleachBit.

Attached: 1465363942479.jpg (765x1020, 184K)

okay, explain SSD please
why can't you do the same with SSD? controller keeps all the file system info?

>delete file
>empty recycle bin
Are people really that retarded to computers?

i formatted my storage drive by accident this spring, recovered even files I deleted 3 years ago
that's on 3Tb HGST I keep at 2.3Tb full all the time sometimes full

Ofc storyteller.

ssds come with more storage than advertised for redundancy. when a physical sector on ssd fails, it is virtually reallocated to a sector on that extra space. This is fine, the os shows ok, the problem is that failed sector may not be written again(in other words data overwritten or deleted...), but there is no guarantee that it cannot be read again (the data that was there when it failed), of course you cannot do that easily but law enforcement agencies likely have tools that allow them to read bad sectors,

you can't check this with software?

harddrives by design are much simpler and act more like tape drives in that they basically expose the platter to the operating system/file system driver transparently, the controller on a typical harddrive just provides the interface (ide/sata/scsi) after the cache (for performance) and basically only manage the mechanics needed to read/write to the platter
ssds on the other hand are much more complicated, because of the nature of the flash storage you can write a small amount of data but it needs to be written in chunks (which can often be large, like 4-8kb or more) and to erase/overwrite that data you need to erase the whole cell first (which again can be much larger, as in 256kb or more), because of this you don't want the os/file system writing small amounts of data (like a few bytes at a time) all over the place like you could do with harddrives because if you do this on flash you could be wasting a large amount of space to do so and significantly reducing the lifespan of cells when you need to overwrite that data frequently, so instead ssd controllers manage the flash for the os and they use a few techniques (like wear levelling, in combination with overprovisioning where the drive has more storage capacity than is on the box) so that all the cells can be written to and erased evenly increasing the lifespan, so unlike harddrives (or tape drives) you never get a transparent picture of what the underlying storage looks like
to pre-emptively answer the obvious question: you could let the operating system write to the flash in a transparent manner but it would be complicated and costly writing drivers for thousands of different drives and flash technology and it would be less than ideal having a drive that you can't use because it's too recent for your kernel version to support

Attached: NAND_Flash_Pages_and_Blocks.png (441x268, 9K)

It's done in the SSD firmware and entirely transparent to the OS.
The easy solution is full disk encryption which all major OSs support.

dunno, ssds are managed internally by their own cpu running closed source firmware. I suspect the vendors can do it, but they dont publish this information anywhere. I have not seem any publicly available software that could do it (or even attempt to do it)

>you could let the operating system write to the flash in a transparent manner
also to add to this, on earlier harddrives it was possible to read/write to specific platters themselves to the point you could generally guess where on the physical platter the data was, but more modern and high density drives will report a fake geometry to the computer so that they can handle it internally and more efficiently, ssds are essentially just a continuation of this trend
it's not done maliciously but for performance/longevity/etc

Just turn yourself in already, pedo. There's no escaping