WASHINGTON — A three-month internal review conducted by senior U.S. surface fleet leaders found some or significant concerns with the ship handling skills of nearly 85 percent of its junior officers, and that many struggled to react decisively to extricate their ship from danger when there was an immediate risk of collision, according to an internal message obtained by Defense News.
Led by the Surface Warfare Officer School, officer of the deck competency checks were conducted on a random selection of OOD-qualified first-tour division officers (the newest officers in the fleet) in underway bridge navigation simulators fleet-wide between January and March. Of the 164 officers who were evaluated, only 27 passed with “no concerns.” Another 108 completed with “some concerns,” and 29 had “significant concerns,” according to the message, which was released by the Navy’s top surface warfare officer Vice Adm. Richard Brown.
Brown, who leads Naval Surface Force Pacific, termed the results “sobering.”
The evaluations raise distressing questions about the level of ship handling training junior officers get both prior to their arrival at their first command and when they arrive. In a Tuesday interview with Defense News at the Pentagon, Brown said the checks would be used to inform new training in development for young officers and that changes were already underway that show the Navy is serious about self-assessment and improvement in the wake of the twin disasters that claimed the lives of 17 sailors last summer.
Officers struggled with operating radars and the associated tools at hand, an issue that emerged in the wake of the Fitzgerald accident. Officers had a firm grasp of the international rules of the road for navigating ships at sea, but struggled to apply them practically during watch standing, especially in low-visibility situations. Most officers were able to keep clear of close encounters with other ships in the simulator but those that found themselves in extremis “were often ill-equipped to take immediate action to avoid collisions” — a factor that was a direct contributor to the loss of life in both the John S. McCain and Fitzgerald collisions in 2017. In his message to the fleet, Brown said the OOD competency reviews should be a call to action for the surface community to get after its shortcomings.
“While the OOD competency checks were a snapshot in time, we must be realistic in confronting the systemic shortfalls that they revealed in core proficiencies across the junior qualified members of the force,” Brown said in the message. “We as a community can and must tackle our deficiencies and ensure there is meaningful experience behind our qualification letters.” The areas of concern listed in the message conjure unsettling reminders of the 2017 accidents. In the case of McCain, confusion and indecision took hold on the bridge at the precise moment when the ship had to take immediate actions to avoid a collision, despite the presence of the commanding officer.
Dylan Howard
Either elongate it or re-format it completely.
Luis Miller
bump
Aiden Taylor
>Officers struggled with operating radars and the associated tools at hand >mfw I was better at driving ships as a child than the Navy is now
And Americans belittle the training of China when China can now field better seamen.
Jaxson Evans
Hate to say it but when a ship is manned by unmotivated niggers you're going to have a bad time. Especially when an officer needs to punish one of the niggers. The white man thinks he's so superior well fuck him etc.
Ryan Reyes
>Shortfalls in seamen
Did they not check the shower drains and female lower enlisted's panties?
The navy sucks dick at ship handling and general good seamanship. The USCG is actually very good at this in general.
T.Work on tugboats
Jacob Allen
Inb4 the proposed solution is a three-hour-long PowerPoint presentation that doesn't actually teach anyone anything and the issue is ignored for another three years.
Jaxson Ward
Yup
The CG overall is arguably the most intelligent and best branch to be in
Spent all my free time banging hot Cuban whores in Florida the entire time I was in, and you get to see anywhere you want around the US and its territories
Xavier Davis
Sure, except you're not a branch tho
OOD/SWO/EOOW Qualed 1110 here.
Most officers suck at shiphandling, it's true. There is usually like 3 JOs and the Captain that know what they are doing and everybody else sucks. The DHs haven't driven a ship since they were 1st tour JOs usually, so like 6-7 years, and Ensigns can arrive at the fleet with literally no training. A deck seamen who gets shit on by the entire military establishment actually has considerably more formal training than a brand new 1130 ensign, potentially (as was my case). So they drop these officers, who, btw, are the lowest quality USN unrestricted line guys straight on to the boat with 0 days 0 hours 0 minutes 0 seconds of training and are shocked that they aren't competent.
Then the skipper will OOD and SWO qual you just to get you off his boat, even if you're retarded, because his fit rep takes a hit if he actually maintains the standard and fails JOs that don't measure up. Insanity.
Parker Flores
>junior officers first tour
Isn't that the point, to train them at sea?
Blake Walker
>only 27 passed with “no concerns.” 0% of them were women, guaranteed.
Carson Long
This. It's also what happens when you put so much focus on what someone is "qualified in" on paper vs what they can actually do. Then everyone scratches their heads when EM3 takes 440v straight to the heart cause he was too fucking dumb to check breakers. Or when ENS fucknuts gets our collective shit pushed in by a tugboat.
That and I just wanna say all you JOs that think you're hot shit because you binge watched "the last ship" on Netflix while at the academy can choke on my dick.
Alright I'm done ranting now sorry yall.
>t. 2nd class
Hunter Cook
As an MWO in the RAN (aus equivalent of USN SWO) it always amazes me how little initial training your junior officers get.
By the time I’m qualified to stand a watch as an OOD (or OOW as we call it) I will have done nearly two years of theoretical training and time as an assistant officer of the watch on both frigates, destroyers and smaller ships like patrol boats.
It surely can’t be a surprise to anyone that if you dump junior officers into positions of responsibility with limited training they will struggle.
Landon Ross
>PQS Bullshit
That's definitely a large portion of it. I think an even larger part of it is the whole watchstander/billet dichotomy. So you have your billet, your day-to-day job, your regular underway watchstanding job (bridge watch, if you're a JO, although you might sit surface in CIC) and your GQ station.
Generally none of these will be even remotely related. You're an EM, I guess, and it's likely that your GQ station IRL is going to be rigging casualty power, which obviously your regular job prepares you pretty well for. As an officer, it's generally the case that none of your three jobs have any connection whatsoever to one another. You're going to suck at least one of them, and generally, that will be watchstanding, since at least you only do that when you're underway.
I guarantee that those guys in this test that passed the pilotage simulation with flying colors were more or less ghosts in their division. There just aren't enough hours in the day, when you start from 0, to get good enough at everything in the time you have allotted. I know I came aboard with 0 training and told the chief he was going to run the division solo basically while I focused entirely on my watchstanding. So that system needs a total-rethink. Chiefs should run divisions and leave Os to be full-time watchstanders, IMO.
I've done RIMPAC and a few other things with the RAN and yeah, the difference in training and just overall maturity for guys of the same rank is stark. Do you also have the permanent topside/engineering career track like the RN? Because that made a lot of sense to me, as opposed to the USN method of starting you with no training and expecting you to master everything in 6-10 months. (don't laugh, our ship was in overhaul when I reported and it took my like 30 minutes to figure out how to come aboard I was so green)
Caleb Sanchez
I'm not an EM actually, that's just a quick couple stories from my deployments.
>not enough hours in the day
I feel your pain on this, absolutely. If I can give you any advice (not sure how long you've been at this), dont micromanage your div/dept. Encourage a policy of them policing each other and if anything they fuck up gets up to you and YOU have to be the one to stop it, bring the fucking hammer down. It lets us feel like adults at our level and trusted to manage our own business, and takes a great deal of weight off your shoulders.
Andrew Howard
Yeah engineers have an entrirely separate training continuum to MWOs.
All MWOs focus on is driving ships and divisional work
Jordan Williams
>Don't micromanage your div
I totally agree with this-- aside from PQS spotchecks and counseling I didn't interact with the division much because, why? Like what do I have to offer the division as a 22 y/o ensign if the chief is competent? Almost nothing. So I got very good at things the chief couldn't do (drive the ship, run the engineering plant) and left the division to do it's own thing and just checked at the end of the day to make sure things were still on the rails. I'm out now though. CRUDES life sucks hot ass for SWOs. I hope you're out of the barracks at least, I don't know how you guys put up with it.
Daniel Morgan
Oh and one thing I was thinking about, I'm curious to know what class of ship was in the situation vs. what class the officers came from; I wouldn't expect a small boy OOD to handle a simulation on an amphib well etc etc.
Ethan Scott
is this picture what i think it is?
Brayden Myers
Been out of the barracks for a hot minute but honestly I didnt mind it that much. I'm in a pretty uncommon rate though so I spent a LOT of time at sea (4 deployments in 4 years)
